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In the absence  of  adequate  extension  services,  retailers  have become  the  major  information  source
for  farmers’  pesticide  use  in rural  China.  Pesticide  application  for smallholders  is rather  complex,  and
mistakes  can  lead  to signiﬁcant  crop  losses.  Farmers,  therefore,  seek  sources  of  information  regarding
pesticide  use. This  paper  ﬁrst  explores  how  different  kinds of  retailers  may  employ  different  strategies  of
providing  information  to  farmers.  We  ﬁnd  that for village,  town,  and  county  retailers,  the  more  familiar
they  are  with  farmers,  the  more  likely  they  are  to  amplify  the  recommended  dosage  of  pesticide  use.
In  cooperatives,  who  buy  pesticides  from  an  extension  station,  the  information  is  directly  transferred  to
member  farmers  without  information  distortion.  Apart  from  examining  retailers’  different  strategies  of
information  provision,  this  paper  also  asks  in  how  far  farmers’  trust  in retailers  may  affect  pesticide  use.  It
ﬁnds  that trust  in  different  kinds  of  retailers  indeed  varies  and  plays  a critical  role  in  converting  informa-
tion  into  farming  behavior.  Members  of  the  cooperative  show  rather  high  levels  of trust  in their  retailer,
while  farmers  who  are  not  members  of a cooperative  show  low  levels  of  trust  in retailers.  Pesticide  use
is a joint  result  of  retailers’  information  provision  strategies  and  farmers’  trust.  The  lowest  pesticide  use
occurs  when  accurate  information  is  provided  and  when  farmers  highly  trust  the  information  provider.
Overuse  occurs  with  either  information  distortion  or low  levels  of  trust.  Cooperatives  have advantages
both  in terms  of  information  provision  and  trust,  thereby  leading  to  the  lowest  use  of  pesticides.
© 2014  Royal  Netherlands  Society  for Agricultural  Sciences.  Published  by Elsevier  B.V.  All  rights
reserved.. Introduction
.1. Problem statement
Recently, agricultural pollution has drawn additional attention
o China. Most attention is paid to pollutants, such as NH3-N and
OD, which are mainly caused by the overuse of fertilizers and
missions from animal manure. However, the massive use of pesti-
ides exerts considerable impacts on health and the environment.
hina is the largest pesticide user in the world; in 2012, its pesti-
ide consumption was over 1.8 million tons [1]. A major portion of
prayed pesticides pollute the soil, water and air [2].Furthermore, the health risks that are caused by pesticides are
ore directly harmful than are those of chemical fertilizers. First,
n China as well as in other developing countries, many farmers
∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail address: jinshuqin@126.com (S. Jin).
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.njas.2014.10.003
573-5214/© 2014 Royal Netherlands Society for Agricultural Sciences. Published by Elsespray pesticides without any protection measures (e.g., masks or
long-sleeve shirts). The period for the occurrence of pests and dis-
eases is generally during the hottest season when pesticides diffuse
well. Therefore, it is very common for farmers to become contam-
inated by pesticides during spraying. Exposure to pesticides can
cause health problems, such as hormone disruption, damages to
the brain, and cancer [3]. Second, pesticide residues seriously pol-
lute the soil. For example, although China has forbidden the use
of organic chloride since 1983, DDT is still the ﬁrst organic pol-
lutant for soil pollution. As indicated by the Report of the National
Survey on Soil Pollution, 1.9% of surveyed areas were polluted by
DDT [4]. Third, the cleaning of spraying instruments causes water
(both surface and groundwater) and atmospheric pollution, which
can cause serious damages to the ecosystem. Fourth, when farmers
dilute pesticides, they often discard pesticide packages on the spot,
which has become an additional serious environmental problem
in rural China. It is estimated that, annually, more than 3.2 billion
pesticide packages are discarded in China. The total package waste
weighs more than 100,000 tons, with the residue pesticide from
vier B.V. All rights reserved.
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hese packages accounting for 2%∼5% of the total weight of pes-
icides [5]. Therefore, because of environmental concerns and to
revent health threats, more attention should be paid to China’s
esticide problems.
Pesticide overuse in crop production is a common problem in
eveloping countries. As one of the most important cash crops of
hina, cotton follows the classic ‘pesticide treadmill’ [6]; namely,
nce the pests become resistant, even more pesticides will need
o be used [7]. China is the largest cotton-planting country in
he world, accounting for approximately 25% of total global yield.
n China, cotton producers are among the largest pesticide users
n terms of both aggregate and per hectare use, and pesticide
se increased more rapidly than that of other agricultural inputs
8]. If environmental and health impacts are considered, the eco-
omic returns from pesticide use cannot compensate for its impacts
9–12].
.2. Analytical framework
Existing literature provides various explanations for pesticides
over)use. We  can group these explanations into four categories.
1) Household and farm characteristics.  Damalas and Hashemi [13]
ound that young cotton growers care more about health hazards
ith regard to pesticides than do elder farmers, and elder cotton
rowers usually spray more frequently. Furthermore, the farm scale
atters. Cameron [14] found that large-scale farmers are more
ikely to adopt environmentally sound technology and manage-
ent systems. Farmers’ low perceptions, as well as their lack of
nowledge of pesticides risk, were also positively correlated with
veruse [15,16]. (2) Market factors.  Grovermann’s [17] observation
rom Thailand shows that crop prices can inﬂuence pesticide appli-
ation. In this case, farmers apply larger amounts of pesticides to
rops (e.g., bell peppers) that can be sold at higher price. (3) Tech-
ical application and extension. Research so far has demonstrated
hat some technologies have the potential to reduce the use of
esticide; however, to make these technologies effective, exten-
ion services are needed to overcome pesticide overuse. Kumar and
olleagues [18] found that foliar application was in general more
ffective than were other ways of spraying (e.g., stem application)
hen dealing with sucking pests on cotton. Huang and colleagues
8] found that in China, the introduction of GMO  technology has
ramatically reduced pesticide use in cotton in terms of quan-
ity, spraying times and costs. However, GMO  technology has only
ad short-term effects on pesticide reduction. A long-term obser-
ation (1998-2009) in Northern China describes the outbreak of
 secondary pest that led to a re-increase in pesticide use [19].
urrently, pesticide use in cotton is even higher than it was in
997 [20]. Therefore, to support effective pesticide use, extension
ervices are crucial. Sun and colleagues [21] conclude that inad-
quate agricultural extension services have been considered the
ost important external factors for the overuse of chemical inputs,
ncluding pesticides. The lack of extension services is also stressed
n studies in African countries as an obstacle to reduce pesticide
se with better methods of pest control, e.g., by Integrated Pest
anagement (IPM) or Integrated Crop Management (ICM) [22,23].
4) Institutional constraints.  Togbé and colleagues [23] hold that a
ack of alignment among key actors within the cotton sector is the
ain obstacle to employing more environmentally friendly pest-
anagement strategies in Benin.
In addition to these conventional factors, pests and diseases
hange quickly depending on the weather and seasons, and it
s difﬁcult for smallholders to select the best and most effective
esticides from hundreds of active ingredients. As reported by
he Ministry of Agriculture, at the end of 2012, there were 627
ctive ingredients with 27,273 registered pesticides in China [24].
mallholders face considerable difﬁculties in understanding whichf Life Sciences 72–73 (2015) 23–32
pesticides to use and how, making these farmers more dependent
on external information sources, e.g., from those who sell pesti-
cides or extension technicians. Insufﬁcient levels of spraying, the
use of wrong pesticides or improper application might result in the
outbreak of pests and diseases, with the consequence of lower or
even no harvest. Thus, farmers can be assumed prudent regarding
pesticides use and may  be tempted to use more pesticides than are
actually needed, both in terms of quantity and varieties, to mitigate
the risk of disease outbreak.
As previously mentioned, the lack of extension services is a
common problem in developing countries. In China, since the late
1980s, the central government started a reform aiming at the
commercialization of the agricultural extension system aiming to
reduce the ﬁnancial burden for both the central and local gov-
ernments and to make agricultural extension stations ﬁnancially
self-sufﬁcient. As investigated by Hu and colleagues [25], after this
reform, many extension staff quit their positions in the extension
stations and run their own business, e.g., selling pesticides and fer-
tilizers. The remaining extension staff are frequently called on for
duties that have nothing to do with agricultural extension (e.g.,
family planning, budget management, elections, and ﬁre protec-
tion), and only 31% of their working days were spent on providing
extension services. In comparison, before the reform, in 1985, 85%
of their working days were spent on providing extension services
[26]. In contemporary China, a common saying that is used to char-
acterize the agricultural extension system is “The network destroyed,
the lines are broken, and people went away” (wang po, xian duan, ren
san) [27], which means that the system is ruined, the connection
between the technical staff and farmers is broken, and the staff has
left (and, as a connotation that comes with the saying, does its own
business).
With this absence of governmental extension services, the
information sources for smallholders regarding the correct use
of pesticides are rather limited. Existing literature suggests that
smallholders may  gain knowledge from their own  experiences by
learning from other farmers, by reading manuals/information pro-
vided with pesticides, or by learning from pesticide sellers [28–30].
In China, a limited number of studies suggest that the major infor-
mation source for smallholders regarding pesticide application is
retailers [31]. Nevertheless, until now, the inﬂuence of retailers’
advice on pesticide use has barely been studied. In rural areas of
developing countries, different kinds of retailers exist. Mom-and-
pop stores in the village may  sell pesticides together with everyday
commodities; township-level shops will sell pesticides together
with other agricultural inputs and technologies; and more special-
ized shops on the county-level will provide a wider portfolio of
pesticides. We can assume that depending on this degree of profes-
sionalization across shops, their strategies of information provision
will vary in consulting on pesticide use. Therefore, this research will
focus on the inﬂuence of different kinds of retailers’ information
provision strategies on farmers’ pesticides use.
In addition to this focus, a further factor will be explored in its
impact on pesticide use. While there is only limited research on
trust as a factor for information use and farmers’ behavioral change,
this limited research suggests that trust plays an important role in
translating information into knowledge that can be used and acted
upon by farmers [32–34]. Therefore, another and equally impor-
tant factor is farmers’ trust in the information provider, which
is assumed to determine the extent to which farmers will make
use of the information in their actual pesticide use. Generally
speaking, trust refers to the conﬁdence that someone will not dis-
appoint the expectations or exploits the vulnerabilities of the other
[35,36]. As a binding element for communities and societies, trust
can promote cooperation and efﬁciency, not only for economic
exchange but also for public goods, such as environmental pro-
tection [37–39]. The general level of trust differs across societies.
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ccording to Fukuyama [40], trust in group-oriented societies, such
s Germany and Japan, is greater than is trust in family- and/or
cquaintance-oriented societies, such as China. Being largely dom-
nated by Confucian values (e.g., “keeping face”/mianzi,  guanxi)  for
housands of years, Chinese people build mutual trust on personal
elationships, particularly in rural areas [41].
With the focus on the information providers and their
nformation-provisioning strategies, as well as on the trust of farm-
rs in information providers, pesticide use is not considered a result
f independent decision-making by an individual farmer. Farm-
rs’ decision-making regarding pesticide use, in this research, is
ainly based on both the information they receive and their trust
n the information providers. However, as denoted in the above
erm “information provision strategies”, we assume that if farm-
rs and retailers are familiar with each other, the information
hat is delivered by the retailers will differ. Furthermore, links are
ssumed among different sources of information, e.g., the retailers
ay  recommend the dosage based on the manuals. The analyti-
al framework underlying this study is shown in Fig. 1. While the
bove-mentioned different kinds of retailers are not shown in this
gure, we will further specify, in the following, retailers based on
ur survey data.
The main research questions are as follows: (1) From whom do
armers buy pesticides? What are the differences among farmers
ith regard to the way they obtain information and also in regard
o the contents of information? (2) How does trust function when
armers convert the information into actual behavior regarding
esticide use? This study also aims to provide policy recommen-
ations regarding where intervention is needed aiming at more
fﬁcient and environmentally sound pesticide use.
. Methodology
.1. Deﬁning pesticide use
When collecting data on active ingredient use among larger
umbers of smallholders in rural China, a major difﬁculty exists.
ue to their low education level and their lack of documenta-
ion, it is difﬁcult for farmers to correctly collect information
egarding, among others, active ingredients, concentration, and
osage of spraying. A more practical but less precise method
or collecting data regarding pesticide use is to use the costs of
esticides as a proxy for the physical quantities of active ingredi-
nts used. This method has been applied previously in studies in
he ﬁelds of environmental/agricultural economics and rural pol-
cy/extension, usually complemented with data on the frequency of
praying.
For example, Huang and colleagues [8] used costs as the indi-
ator for pesticide use when comparing pesticide use for Bt and
on-Bt cotton across time and regions (e.g., between Zhejiangf Life Sciences 72–73 (2015) 23–32 25
Province and Hunan Province). However, these authors also used
quantitative data when comparing the same counties and at the
same time (e.g., between Bt and non-Bt cotton growers in Xinji
County with a dataset from 1999). In other studies, pesticide
overuse was  deﬁned as the amount of pesticides that were used
in excess of an economic optimum, and the costs of pesticides
were used as an indicator to represent the amount of pesticides
[17,42].
The assumptions underlying such a proxy are that with increases
in costs, the amount of active ingredients in the pesticides
increases, and environmental impacts will accordingly increase.
This assumption may  be acceptable if two  preconditions apply.
First, in terms of toxicity, the same or similar active ingredients
must be used by farmers, which will, in general, be the case when
the targeted crop is the same. In the case at hand, farmers are from
the same location, i.e. are facing similar problems in terms of pests
and diseases, and work under similar environmental conditions.
The second, and often ignored, precondition is that price differ-
ences need to be considered when comparing farmers who buy
pesticides from different retailers.
In this study, we,  therefore, will also use costs as a proxy for
pesticide quantity. However, we further consider the two above-
mentioned preconditions:
(1) We  conducted our survey among cotton farmers within one
county. A county is not large enough for a variety of pests to
occur. Farmers, therefore, will be dealing with similar problems
in terms of pests and diseases in cotton plantations and are
likely to choose pesticides within a similar range.
(2) We  tried to obtain information on the price differences across
different retailers. We  ﬁrst identiﬁed the most commonly
used pesticides (i.e., Avermectins, Emamectin Benzoate, and
Acetamiprid). By ﬁxing a certain concentration and volume (or
weight) for each pesticide, we requested the prices from dif-
ferent retailers (at the village, township and county levels), to
determine the price differences across retailers. On average,
farmers buying from the county retailers buy at the lowest
price, while those buying from the village retailers pay the
highest price. The largest price difference is 8%∼10% between
farmers buying from county retailers and farmers buying from
village retailers. Thus, if the cost difference is greater than 10%
across farmers, we  will assume a difference in terms of the
pesticide amount.
2.2. Method of data collection
We conducted our survey in Quzhou County, Hebei Province,
China. Hebei is the third largest cotton-planting province of
China, after the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region and Shan-
dong Province. In 2012, the cotton-sown area of Hebei was
578,000 ha, accounting for 12.3% of the total sown area of China
[1]. Quzhou County is located in Southern Hebei Province. Cot-
ton is the major cash crop of Quzhou County. As estimated by
the County Agricultural Bureau, in 2012, the cotton sown area
was 15,000 ha, accounting for 31% of the total farming area of the
county.
We conducted this research by means of interviews and a
survey in January 2013. Interviews with pesticide retailers from
the village level to the county level aimed at qualitatively deter-
mining the bilateral relationship between farmers and different
retailers built on information and trust. We interviewed 28 retail-
ers, among which 2 retailers were at the county level, 10 were
town retailers (in 4 towns), and 16 were village retailers (in 8
villages). A survey was furthermore carried out among cotton
growing households to collect detailed information on pesti-
cide use. 160 household questionnaires were collected from the
26 S. Jin et al. / NJAS - Wageningen Journal of Life Sciences 72–73 (2015) 23–32
Table  1
Data collection strategy.
Level County Towns Villages Households
Sites Quzhou 4 out of 10 towns in
the county
2 villages for each
selected town
Randomly selected
from the selected
villages
Sampling for retailers and households 2 major retailers in the
county capital
2-3 retailers from each
town
2  retailers from each
village
15-30 for each village*
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* mainly based on the size of the village; for villages with a larger population, we
 villages in which cotton is the main cash crop. The house-
olds were selected based on random sampling, resulting in the
nintended consequence that some of the farm households are
embers of a cooperative. Table 1 shows the strategy of our data
ollection.
For the survey, we targeted the heads of the households, regard-
ess of gender. However, only 6 out of the 160 respondents were
emale, which might be due to a misinterpretation in the question-
aire. ‘Head of household’ was meant to refer to the one who makes
ecisions regarding agricultural or/and other economic activities
n the family. Farmers might have understood ‘head of household’
s the one whose name carries the hukou of the family, and, in
ost cases in rural China, this is the husband. We  have no indi-
ation from our study or from other studies on pesticide use in
hina [see 26, 8, 31] that gender is a major factor in explain-
ng pesticide use or information collection. Our random sample
rought about a rather representative distribution of education
evels: 3.1% of the respondents were illiterate, 16.3% had a pri-
ary school education, 52.5% had a middle school education, and
8.1% had a senior high-school education. The distribution in the
ample is similar to that of other survey samples in rural China
43–45].
The average age of the household heads was 48 years, with the
oungest being 25 years old and the oldest 83 years old. Many of
he heads had long-term experience in cotton cultivation, with an
verage of more than 14 years. More detailed information on the
ouseholds is provided in Table 2. Agriculture is the main source
f income, accounting for an average of 62.6% of the total income.
otton is the major crop of the households, accounting for more
han 66% of the total farming area.
The average area under cotton was 7.94 mu  (15 mu = 1 ha), of
hich 19.7% was rented land, almost the same as the average
ational land circulation rate [20%, see 46]. Fig. 2 shows the dis-
ribution of the cotton-sown area. Most of the cotton-growing
ouseholds cultivate areas ranging from 1 to 10 mu (125 out of
he 160 surveyed households), which is consistent with the general
haracteristics of Chinese smallholders’ agriculture.
Based on these characteristics of the survey sample, we may
onclude that most indicators are consistent with the average val-
es for the whole country, and thus, the sample may  be considered
epresentative.
able 2
escriptive data of the survey households (N = 160).
Minimum 
Total household members 1 
Labor  staying at home 1 
Total  income (yuan*) 1,000 
Percentage of non-farm income (%) .0 
Total  farm area (mu**) 2 
Area  under cotton plantation (mu) 0.5 
Ratio  of rented land for cotton (%) 0 
ource: Field data 2013.
* During the survey (Jan. 2013), 8.2 yuan = 1 euro.
** 15 mu  = 1 ha.lers 16 retailers 160 households
ted a bigger sample.
3. Results
3.1. General picture of pesticide use
Although we  did not record the quantity of pesticide use for
previously mentioned reasons, to generally test to what extent
farmers are overusing pesticides, we followed a similar method
as that of Dasgupta and colleagues [15] in Bangladesh by setting
the dosage that is recommended by the manual as a baseline.
The manual is part of the package (for powder) or label (for liq-
uid), so farmers receive the manuals when they buy pesticides.
The manual contains information on the trading name, active
ingredients, concentration, toxicity level, dosage (or times of dilu-
tion), the advised interval between two sprays, targeted crops
and pests, individuals particularly sensitive to harm by the pes-
ticide, protective measures needed, and impacts on non-targeted
animals. In China, the Regulation for Pesticides Administration [47]
requires that ‘any new pesticides before its registration must be exper-
imented with ﬁeld crops under the supervision of local agricultural
bureaus to test its effective dosage and impacts on the environment
and non-targeted pests, birds, and animals’. Thus we assume the
dosage that is recommended by the manual is basically technically
sound.
In our sample, the survey respondents were asked, among
others, the question “Did you read the manual before using pes-
ticides?”, followed by the question “Compared to the dosage that
is recommended by the manual, how much do you usually use?”.
Among 143 respondents who ever read the manuals before spray-
ing, 12.6% used more or less the same as the manual recommended;
73.4% used up to double the recommended dosage; and 14.0% use
more than double of the manual’s recommended dosage.
However, only 13.2% of the respondents realized that they were
overusing pesticides and thought that pesticide use should be
reduced to some extent, while 79.2% thought that as long as cotton
is planted, they must use as much pesticides as current levels, no
matter how high the price. A total of 7.6% of the respondents even
would like to use more pesticides if the prices decreased, demon-
strating that in cotton planting, a strong perceived dependence on
pesticide exists among farmers.
Regarding the way  farmers spray, most of the farmers mixed
several types of pesticides in one spray. A total of 88.4% of
Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
10 4.8 1.7
6 2.7 1.2
230,000 33,490 23,072
96.7 37.4 27
65 12 7.7
40 7.9 6.6
100 19.7 33.3
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tFig. 2. Distribution of the surveyed far
he respondents mixed three or four types of pesticides in one
pray, 7.1% mixed two types, and 4.5% used one type. In terms
f the concentration of active ingredients, for the same active
ngredient, 72.4% of the respondents preferred to use higher con-
entrations, which are more environmentally unfriendly but less
abor-consuming. A total of 2.6% of the surveyed farmers used lower
oncentrations, while 25% chose the concentration depending on
he severity of the pests.
Factorie s 
County
retailers
Town
retailers
V
re
Farmers
56.2
25%
60%
40%
Fc:5.1%
Fv:65.6%
Ft:19.1%
100%
Fig. 3. Distribution of pesticide bccording to cotton ﬁeld size (N = 160).
3.2. From whom do farmers buy pesticides?
In the analysis of our data, we  make an analytical distinction
in from where farmers buy pesticides and from where they may
obtain information on proper pesticide use. In this section, we
present from where survey farmers buy pesticides.
Fig. 3 combines information from both qualitative interviews
with the retailers and the household questionnaires. The direction
illage
tailers
Extensio n 
station
Cooperati ve 
members
5%
Fcoop:10.2%
100%
18.75%
100%
uy–and-sell relationships.
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f the arrows indicates ‘who buys from whom’. Apart from the 3
ouseholds who buy pesticides from a visiting retailer or other
ources, we obtained four groups of farmers based on the suppliers
rom whom they buy. Among the remaining 157 households, the
argest part (65.6%, equaling 103 farmers) bought pesticides from
he village retailers, the retailer with the most diversiﬁed sources
f pesticides.
Retailers can buy pesticides from either factories or retailers
n a higher administrative level. Our interviews indicate that the
igher level the retailers, the more likely it is that they buy directly
rom factories. At county level, both the county retailers and the
xtension station buy pesticides from factories. Also 60% of town-
hip retailers, and 18.75% of village retailers buy pesticides from
actories.
The ﬁgure also shows that members of a cooperative (Fcoop) buy
esticides from the shop that is operated by the county extension
tation, directly or through the cooperative. Therefore, retailers
lso serve as extension technicians. Fcoop all buy pesticides from
he extension station, while Fc, Ft, and Fv buy from retailers only.
armers, however, do buy from different pesticide retailers.
.3. Are there differences in the information provision and
ontent?
To ﬁrst verify the dependency of farmers on retailers’ informa-
ion provision, survey ﬁndings are presented regarding farmers’
onsultation of extension services. Our data conﬁrm that farm-
rs seldom obtain information from the governmental extension
ystem. Among the 160 respondents, 135 (84.4%) farmers never
ontacted extension services, and only 26 (15.6%) farmers had
ccess to extension services, in terms of announcements for pests
12 respondents, 7.5%), phone contact with extension technicians
4 respondents, 2.5%), regular ﬁeld visits by extension staff (4
espondents, 2.5%), or farmer schools (5 respondents, 3.1%). There-
ore, for most of the farmers, retailers are indeed the primary source
f information among the professional organizations dealing with
esticides.
As the most important intermediates for information transfor-
ation, different retailers have different sources of information
see Fig. 4). According to our interviews, the county retailers par-
icipated in several agricultural expos and, as they tend to have
etter access to the internet, turn to online information. Some of
he township retailers also participated in such expos (6 out of 10)
nd have also taken some technical training courses (5 out of 10).
he village retailers, however, mainly obtained their information
nd knowledge from the upstream suppliers. The retailers of the
xtension station that is afﬁliated with the cooperative are exten-
ively trained in technology application and are more professional
han other retailers.
The content of information that retailers receive is similar; most
f the time the information is the same as in the manual, althoughf Life Sciences 72–73 (2015) 23–32
there is variance depending on the sources and on the methods
of information access (e.g., upstream retailers, expos, or training).
The question arises whether different retailers deliver the same
information (from the manual) in the same way? Based on the
interviews with the retailers, the answer is no. The ﬁndings suggest
that the closer is the relationship between the buyers and retailers,
the more distortion of information exists in terms of pesticide use
quantity, - except for the cooperative, which differs from others in
terms of information delivery.
For the county retailers, the below citation is indicative of their
information provision strategies when farmers buy pesticides.
We mainly sell our pesticides to the retailers at town and village
levels. Farmers are actually not the main buyers and source of
revenue for us. When farmers come to buy pesticides, we will
let them look at the manual. Or if they ask, we will tell them
the same information as written on the manual. But I know that
it is common for them to use more for each spray, or to use in
shorter intervals between two sprays.
County retailer in Quzhou, 16-01-2013
Among the 10 township retailers that we interviewed, 7 sug-
gested farmers to use pesticides as indicated on the manual or as
their own  upstream suppliers told them, and 3 suggested farmers to
use, based on their own experiences, a bit more than was indicated
in the manual.
Village retailers have less access to information and are less
knowledgeable on pesticides than are their counterparts in the
township and county. Consequently, these retailers do not feel
very self-conﬁdent when farmers consult them on pesticide dosage
and spraying. To maintain a good relationship and trust within
their “acquaintance community”, village retailers often intention-
ally amplify the advised amount of pesticide use, “just to be safe”.
Some of these retailers will amplify the dosage for each spray; some
will recommend a shorter interval between two  sprays. The fol-
lowing quote from one village retailer can clearly reﬂect why  these
retailers amplify the recommended quantity.
We’ve been living in this village for hundreds of years, and
everyone knows each other very well. We  all even have the same
family name. It is not a one-shot deal to sell pesticides within
the village. So ﬁrstly, I do not dare to sell fake pesticides, other-
wise, they will curse my  grandfather and I will not have face in
front of the village mates. Secondly, I would like to recommend
them to use more than the upstream retailer told me,  normally
1.5 times, not to sell more, but to ensure the pests can be killed
as soon as possible. Otherwise, they will not trust me  and will
go to buy from other shops.
Shop owner in Liuzhuang village, Quzhou, 16-01-2013
Cooperatives know better what is the actual required pesti-
cide quantity for their members’ crops and how to reach them
[48]. Farmers are integrated in the process of information trans-
fer, e.g., members can directly obtain ﬁrst-hand information
from the extension technicians from where the cooperative buys
pesticides.
From these ﬁndings, we summarize information provision
mechanisms as depicted in Fig. 4. The width of the arrows
represents the degree of information distortion for pesticide
dosage.
3.4. How does trust function in converting information to
pesticide use?As we  argued earlier, farmers’ ﬁnal decisions on pesticide use
are assumed to depend on both the information provision strategy
of different kinds of retailers and the degree that the farmers trust
the informants.
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To determine the farmers’ general trust level as well as to deter-
ine where the retailers rank in such a trust assessment, based on
 method applied by World Values Survey [49], we  asked farmers
o score their trust in different groups of people, with scores of 0
o 10, indicating distrust to full trust, respectively. The results (see
ig. 5) provide additional evidence for Fukuyama’s postulation of
hina being a family-based society [38], where kinship-based trust
s rather high, and generalized social trust is low. We  carried out
ndependent-sample t tests between every two neighboring groups
the closest in terms of scores). The t tests demonstrate that trust in
amily members is signiﬁcantly higher than trust in all of the other
ategories (p = 0.000), and trust in strangers is signiﬁcantly lower
han in all of the other categories (p = 0.000). The differences in the
rust in the central government and trust in extension staff, trust
n village neighbors and trust in retailers, and trust in retailers and
rust in local government are statistically signiﬁcant (p = 0.0057,
.000, and 0.0012, respectively). Figure 5 also demonstrates that,
lthough extension staff is hardly accessible, those farmers who
ave the chance to access extension staff have a relatively high
evel of trust in them (8.18). Furthermore, farmers who can easily
ccess extension services, cooperative members for example, have
ven greater trust in the extension staff (with an average score of
.81). These scores may  reﬂect farmers’ need for extension services.
armers’ trust in retailers is relatively low, with an average score of
.37, ranking as the third-last, with only the local government and
trangers being less trusted in.
Given our differentiation in retailers, we further examined farm-
rs’ trust across pesticide retailers. Results show that Fcoop give
ather high scores (8.4) for their trust in retailers, followed by Fv
6.3), Ft (6.0), and Fc (5.9). The two-samples t test reveals a sig-
iﬁcant difference between Fcoop and non-Fcoop’s trust in retailers
p = 0.002).
However, in China, most farmer cooperatives, especially crop-
lanting cooperatives, are organized based on villages. Members
f a cooperative are also village mates, which is also the case in
ur sample. With random sampling, all of the Fcoop are farmers
rom Dajie Village of Henantuan Town. We,  therefore, cannot totally
xclude that the high trust levels in the cooperative’s retailer may
lso be a function of a general greater-than-average trust level
mong villagers of these villages.
Once we veriﬁed that farmers’ levels of trust in retailers indeed
iffer, we examine the potential effects of these differences on pes-
icide use. Table 3 is based on answers to the question “Based on
hat do you decide the actual quantity of pesticides to use?”. The
nswers are highly consistent with farmers’ trust levels in different
etailers, namely the less farmers trust the retailers, the more likely
he farmers decide based on their own judgment.rent groups of people.
As shown in Table 3, the cost differences between any two  types
of farmers are greater than 10%, meaning that the relative order of
costs can reﬂect the amount of pesticides used (see section 2.1).
Thus, Fcoop use the least amount of pesticides, and farmers who
buy from the county shops use the most. Ft use the second least,
and Fv use the third least amount of pesticides. Fcoop show less
pesticide use both in terms of cost and times of spraying. We  car-
ried out independent-sample t tests between every two  groups
of farmers. Differences in the pesticide costs between Fcoop and
Fv, Fcoop and Fc, Fv and Ft, and Ft and Fc are statistically signiﬁ-
cant (p = 0.0003, 0.0001, 0.0067, and 0.0255, respectively) but not
between Fcoop and Ft or Fv and Fc (p > 0.05). The spray times of Fc,
Fv, and Ft were almost the same, meaning that these three groups
of non-cooperative farmers follow a similar interval between two
sprays.
We can also test information distortion by comparing the costs
between farmers who  decide based on the manual and those
who decide based on retailers’ advice. Because there is only one
Ft, and no Fc who  decide based on retailers’ advice, we only
included Fcoop and Fv for such a test. As presented in Table 4,
for Fcoop, there was  no signiﬁcant difference in the costs between
manual-based and retailer-based decisions. However, for Fv, a
two-sample t test revealed that pesticide costs were signiﬁcantly
higher among farmers who  decide based on retailers’ advice than
among farmers who decide based on manuals (=0.0155), further
demonstrating that information is largely distorted by the village
retailers. Additionally, among those farmers who decide based on
manuals, the costs of Fv are greater than those of Fcoop, demon-
strating that, even though both groups make decisions with the
same information, the extent to which they follow the information
differs.
To sum up, for the four groups of farmers, their pesticide
(over)use can be interpreted as follows:
(1) Fcoop: As members of a cooperative, Fcoop can directly obtain
more accurate information from the retailers, who  are at the
same time extension technicians, in whom the farmers highly
trust. Thus, the farmers may  strictly follow what they learn from
the retailers, leading to the lowest use of pesticides.
(2) Fv: The familiarity between Fv and the village retailers is a
double-edged sword. While, compared to Fc and Ft, Fv have
more trust in retailers, to maintain face, the retailers amplify
the pesticide dosage when farmers consult them. The outcome
is pesticide overuse, which even outpaces Ft, who  have lower
trust in retailers but rely on more accurate information.
(3) Fc and Ft: Both obtain information with less distortion
than Fv. However, for Fc, the lowest trust trades off the
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Table  3
Decision basis for pesticide use.
Based on what do you decide the quantity of pesticides to use Costs
(yuan/mu) *
Sprays
(times)
Own judgment Manual Retailers Extension Neighbor
Fcoop 0 9 (56.3%) Equal to extension 7 (43.7%) 0 56.7 8.6
Fv 54 (52.4%) 34 (33%) 12 (11.7%) 0 3 (2.9%) 85.6 16
Ft 20 (66.7%) 7 (23.3%) 1 (3.3%) 0 2 (6.7%) 68.5 16.4
Fc 7 (87.5%) 0 0 1 (12.5%) 0 95.6 16.3
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* During the survey (Jan. 2013), 8.2 yuan = 1 euro; 15 mu = 1 ha.
advantage of less information distortion, and they use the most
pesticides.
. Discussion, conclusion and policy implications
This study demonstrates the interactions between farmers and
etailers, in particular with regard to retailers’ different informa-
ion provision strategies and farmers’ trust in retailers. Some of our
ndings are consistent with those of previous studies. For exam-
le, other studies also found farmers overusing pesticides [e.g., 20,
6], and that farmers seldom obtain technical support [e.g., 8, 25,
1]. China’s extension system is widely criticized due to the very
bsence of any kind of extension system and due to local extension
ctually being accused of contributing to the overuse of agricultural
hemicals by selling chemicals, as extension stations proﬁt from
heir overuse [e.g., 25, 27]. However, while the survey supports the
bservation that only few farmers have access to extension staff, it
lso shows that farmers who buy pesticides from extension stations
re actually using much less than are other farmers.
Our study sheds new light on the role of retailers in the absence
f an effective extension system. We  ﬁnd that farmers buying
esticides from different retailers obtain information in different
ays. Farmers from cooperatives directly obtain accurate informa-
ion on pesticide dosage. For farmers who are not members of a
ooperative, it seems that the more familiar the farmers are with
he retailers, the more distorted is the information that retailers
rovide. Farmers then, again, deal with the information based on
heir trust in retailers; the greater the trust, the more strictly the
armers follow the retailers’ advice. The lowest pesticide use occurs
hen accurate information is provided and when farmers greatly
rust the information provider. Overuse will happen either with
nformation distortion or low trust. Cooperatives had advantages
oth in terms of information provision and trust and thus lead to
he lowest use of pesticides.
The limitations of this study are obvious. First, we only focused
n smallholders. With the development of the land circulation
ystem, large farmers have emerged in China, and these more pro-
essional farmers may  have a different pesticide use. Hence, our
ndings do not automatically apply to these larger farmers. How-
ver, smallholders still provide the main contribution to China’s
griculture. Currently, more than 80% of China’s farming land is
lanted by smallholders [see 46]. Second, survey data are limited in
cope, e.g., the survey only included one cooperative in one village.
able 4
omparison of costs across different decision bases.
Average cost
(yuan/mu)
Manual
(yuan/mu)
Retailers
(yuan/mu)
P value for
t-test
Fcoop 56.7 54.3 59.3 0.4208
Fv 85.6 73.8 101.7 0.0155
ource: Field data 2013.
uring the survey (Jan. 2013), 8.2 yuan = 1 euro; 15 mu = 1 ha.So the results for cooperative members might not be representa-
tive and we should be careful to generalize ﬁndings with respect
to cooperatives. Still, the inclusion of this one cooperative in the
study provided an insight on the potentials of cooperatives as a
solution to reduce pesticide use. Third, we  considered the recom-
mended dosage in the manual as a benchmark for pesticide use and
did not further examine or measure the reliability of the manuals.
As elaborated in section 3.1, we assumed that factories will follow
the Regulation for Pesticides Administration for their manuals. Future
research needs to focus on the producers of pesticides to investigate
and test the reliability of their manuals. Fourth, we  did not discuss
the relationship between trust and information. According to the
literature [e.g., 32, 34, 35], there is no linear relation in the transfor-
mation process from information to knowledge, and further to an
eventual decision and activities based on this decision. However,
in the framework (Fig. 1), we  linked trust and information with the
intermediate variable of “familiarity” between information source
and information user, based on the assumption that trust can best
be achieved within a familiar world [35]. The results of this study
adds evidence to support that more familiarity between informa-
tion source and user leads to higher trust as widely recognized in
rural China [41]. But we  also revealed that higher trust does not
lead to higher accuracy in information delivery. Instead, the vil-
lage retailers in whom farmers have high trust, informed farmers
to amplify the dosage of pesticide use beyond the amount consid-
ered adequate on pesticide manuals. Thus in our case, trust does
not always promote efﬁciency, which largely differs from existing
literature [e.g., 37-39]. And ﬁnally, to answer our research ques-
tions, our study focused on professional organizations as sources
of information on pesticide use, and did not incorporate potential
other sources like neighbors or family members.
Nevertheless, the ﬁndings still allow us to derive some policy
recommendations in regard to ways of reducing pesticide use. First,
the capacity of the extension system should be further strength-
ened. Although since 2012, the Chinese central government has
decided to rebuild the extension network, as represented in the goal
“the extension network should cover every town”, extension services
are still hardly accessible for farmers. Apart from area coverage, the
capacity of the extension system should also be improved by vari-
ous measures, e.g., by enrolling young and professional technicians,
by regular staff training, and by providing the necessary equipment
(e.g., transportation vehicles) for extension stations. One program
that can be integrated in the extension system is the “university
graduates village ofﬁcial program” (daxuesheng cun guan), in which
selected graduate students work as a village ofﬁcial. For selection
of candidates for this program, priority should be given to students
with a degree in agronomy, crop protection, and other agriculture-
related disciplines, so that they can partly play a role as extension
staff and solve more practical problems for farmers. At the same
time, such “internships” will allow students to learn from farm-
ers’ hands-on experience, and how to communicate with farmers,
- skills that are essential in an effective extension system.
Second, as farmers have a high level of trust in the cooperative
in the case at hand, and information transfer is highly effective,
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ooperatives can also be considered a solution to reduce the
veruse of pesticides, e.g., cooperatives may  be approached by
ther extension agencies and be used as a platform to reach farmers.
otential policies can focus on encouraging either the establish-
ent of farmers’ cooperatives or cooperatives to increase their
erformance and service delivery to farmers.
Third, currently, village retailers are partly playing the role of
echnical advisors for many farmers. Thus, it is essential to provide
raining to village retailers, both to increase their knowledge (so
hat they can be at peace with providing accurate information), as
ell as to improve communication with farmers so that they will
orrectly deliver information to them.
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